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Introduction
On 10 November 1975, Brazil voted in favor of resolution 3379 (XXX) 
of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which “[d]etermines that 
Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination”.1 The New York Times, on 
13 November, lambasted that “Brazil’s conscienceless military dictators are seeking 
Arab oil and investments with their votes” (Shame of the U.N. 1975).
Such simplistic explanation can hardly suffice to clarify the controversial 
Brazilian decision, taken in the context of “responsible pragmatism”, the foreign 
policy of president Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979), which sought to make Brazil 
less attached to ideological alignments of the Cold War, and to strengthen the 
country’s autonomy. (Breda dos Santos 2000, 2005; Dávila and Lesser, 2012; 
Pimentel 2002; Seixas Corrêa 2007).
There is a limited number of studies on the Brazilian vote on resolution 
3379 (XXX), such as Sochaczewski (2004), Dávila and Lesser (2012) and Caraciki 
(2013). More often, the episode is commented in texts about Brazil and the 
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1 Resolution 3379 (XXX), “Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination”, approved by a vote of 72 to 35, with 
32 abstentions. The resolution 3379 was subsequently rescinded by UNGA resolution 46/86, of December 1991.



























Middle East (Den Hartog 1989; Breda dos Santos 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2005; 
Lessa 2000; Casarões and Vigevani 2014) or in assessments of foreign policy of 
the military regime (Gonçalves and Myiamoto 1993; Spektor 2009; Vizentini 
1998, Pinheiro 2013). Some texts on Geisel’s government also mention the vote 
(Góes 1978), as much as the memoirs and interviews of key-actors (Abreu 1979; 
D’Araujo and Castro 1997; Spektor 2010; Guerreiro 2010).
Comprehensive studies on Brazilian foreign policy regard the episode, 
implicitly or explicitly, as if the Brazilian affirmative vote for resolution 3379 
(XXX) would be the manifestation of the inherent rationality of the general goals 
and strategic concepts of responsible pragmatism: facing the risk of having Brazilian 
oil supply embargoed by Arab countries, the Brazilian diplomacy redefined its 
position in relation to the conflicts of the Middle East and, ultimately, voted in 
favor of the resolution (Selcher 1978; Cervo and Bueno 2012).
This article is based on diplomatic documents, memoirs and interviews given 
by key decision-makers. It posits that President Geisel took the ultimate decision 
to vote in favor of resolution 3379 (XXX) mainly because the US pressure to vote 
against meant that a change in Brazilian position would be seen as giving up its 
autonomy. This text focuses on the decision-making process of Geisel’s foreign 
policy and explores the idea that the affirmative vote was neither an unavoidable 
nor an expected consequence of responsible pragmatism’s tenets, but rather an 
almost fortuitous choice in face of the need to reassert its position towards the US.
The article is structured in four sections: the first discusses the decision-
making processes for foreign policy during Geisel’s administration; the second 
considers the issue of Middle East and its place in the Brazil-US relations of the 
period; the third reviews the dynamics of the UNGA regarding the Middle East 
and Brazil’s role in it; the fourth tries to interpret the Brazilian vote and identify 
how it fitted the country’s foreign policy.
Foreign policy decision-making under Responsible Pragmatism
Generally speaking, the Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty) has a 
central role in the decision-making process of the Brazilian foreign policy. It can 
be said that the patterns of a differentiated and specialized organizational group 
endowed with their own perceptions and interests is decisive most of the time to 
understand the orientation of Brazilian foreign policy (Drezner 2000; Halperin 
1974; Hill 2003).
For the first decade after the military coup (1964-1973), however, the 
National Security Council (NSC), populated by militaries and not by diplomats, 
and its concepts and principles (national interest, security and development, 
ideological frontiers), enshrined in the National Security Doctrine (NSD), were 
prevalent in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy. The NSD was associated 
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with US security policy for the continent, readapted from the World War II defense 
strategy to an anti-Communist one (Pinheiro, 2013, 70-72).
By the 1973 oil crisis and after Geisel’s inauguration in 1974, it was clear 
that there was a need to adjust the foreign policy due to the diversification of 
the country’s interests, and the changes in the international system. Geisel came 
to power with previous experience in decision-making in foreign matters. He 
resisted the military hard-liners of the regime, who insisted on the principles of 
the NSD and its emphasis on West-East ideological frontiers. Geisel’s economic 
development project was highly depended on imported oil, which required an 
investment in diversification, in particular after the October War resulted in a 
dramatic rise in oil prices and supply cuts by the Arab countries. Brazil realized the 
need to engage the Third World as a political entity, not only a disparate group of 
countries (Gonçalves and Miyamoto 1993). In this context of great international 
economic constraints, it was clear for Brazilian decision makers that the Brazil-US 
relationship was certainly going to suffer in several areas (Pinheiro 2013, 124).
In such scenario, the very idea of an automatic alignment with Washington 
was definitively buried. Both Geisel and his Minister of External Relations, Antonio 
Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, considered that non-interference and respect by the 
US for Brazilian decisions were a cornerstone of their foreign policy. President 
Geisel had a centralizing style; he used to discuss matters with few advisers, but 
decisions where usually taken by him personally. For decisions concerning foreign 
policy, Geisel would consult Silveira first and foremost, and only then hear the 
other adviser. This special relationship between Minister and President was one 
of the main reasons Itamaraty was able to “maintain its position as a central locus 
of policy formulation”. The practice established by Geisel alienated the NSC 
(Pinheiro 2013, 91-95).
Silveira caught Geisel’s attention when the General was still president of 
Petrobras and the ambassador was in Buenos Aires. Just before his election, Geisel 
met Silveira and heard positively his ideas on the importance of Brazil strengthening 
its ties to Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East as a means to make 
its opinions more forceful in the international scenario, and particularly to the 
superpowers. The President was convinced of Silveira’s abilities as a negotiator 
and of the soundness of his ideas. He even decided to ignore the considerable 
reservations expressed by the intelligence and military establishments (Gaspari 
2008; Spektor 2010, Hurrell 2013).
The 1973 oil crisis had spurred the reconceptualization of Brazilian foreign 
policy that would mature under Geisel and Silveira, to be known as responsible 
pragmatism. It had clear inputs from previous Brazilian strategies from the 1960s 
and early 1970s but was innovative in its enunciation and boldness of execution. 
The new doctrine attempted to whitewash Brazil’s international credentials, 
distancing itself from the infamous accusation of sub-imperialism and colonialism 
(Lima and Moura 1982; Vigevani 1974).



























The Brazilian foreign policy wanted to abandon doctrinal concepts that could 
prevent the country from reaching its short and long-term goals. It was meant to 
be, in the words of Spektor (2004), neither stationary nor revolutionary, but rather 
neutralize any aspects of the international system hampering Brazil from realizing 
what it believed to be its potential, as well as manipulating the positive ones. In 
practice, a whole gamut of actions was available to Brazil with the general purposes 
of expanding markets, attracting investors, ensuring the supply of raw materials, 
and avoiding being tied up to the policies of its partners. The country increasingly 
took up a Third World discourse, but without a confrontationist attitude (Lessa 
1998; Spektor 2004; Gonçalves and Miyamoto 1993).
The speech of Silveira at the opening of the UN General Assembly in 1974 
sets out the changes. Its tone and content are direct in clarifying the immediate 
priorities of the government. It underlines support for the independence of 
Portuguese Africa, strongly condemns apartheid, and the use of force, and violent 
occupation of territory in the Middle East, calling the international community to 
“meet with appropriate measures the suffering of the Palestinian people” (Seixas 
Corrêa 2007, 315).
In addition to aiming at an approximation with Arab countries and supporting 
the Palestinian cause, the Geisel administration made relations with developing 
countries a priority. The multilateral dimension of the Brazilian foreign policy 
was guided by efforts to modify the international hierarchy and ensure progress 
in their bilateral relations with developing countries, including Arab countries. A 
clear outcome was the increase in the potential for disagreement with US policies 
(Selcher 1978; Den Hartog 1989; Lessa 1998; Lessa 2000).
Brazil-US relations oscillated significantly after 1945, but the Medici years 
(1969-1973) were normally seen as a moment of improvement. The US political 
strategy towards Latin America had changed. The Nixon Doctrine – with its ideas 
of key-countries and delegation – meant less US interventionism in the continent, 
although in the framework of an unequal partnership; some Latin American 
countries began to diversify their external relations and became more autonomous 
towards Washington. This scenario meant for Brazil not the absence of clashes 
with the US, but rather that the more relevant disagreements were dormant or 
could have their resolution postponed (Pinheiro 2013; Spektor 2009; Cervo and 
Bueno 2012).
There are different understandings of the processes taking place after 1974. 
The more traditional perspective postulates an emerging rivalry between Brazil 
and the US. The underlining logic is that of intra-capitalist dispute between the 
traditional power and the new one, whose ability to follow complementary paths 
had come to an end. This meant a systematic competition and disagreements on 
central issues such as the supply of raw materials, sources of energy, multiplicity 
of partners, etc. Brazil’s adventures in Africa and the Middle East, its policies 
towards South America or its liberality in pursuing partners in strategic domains in 
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Western and Eastern Europe were not necessarily seen as purposeful attacks on US 
hegemony, but certainly as signs of an adversarial behavior. Hence the perception 
that the vote on resolution 3379 (XXX) as a cornerstone in Brazil’s search for 
universalism evolved over three decades in Brazilian academia, with considerable 
nuances (Vigevani 1973; Moniz Bandeira 1989; Gonçalves and Myiamoto 1993; 
Vizentini 1998; Lessa 2000; Cervo and Bueno 2012; Hurrell 2013).
In recent years, Spektor (2009a; 2009b) has spearheaded an effort to reassess 
the changing Brazil-US relations based on heavy use of archival material. In this new 
perception, the idea of emerging rivalry would not describe reality appropriately. 
The assessment is less structural and lays emphasis on conscious efforts by both 
Brazil and the US to build a positive agenda as part of an equalitarian relationship. 
Washington – or at least elements in its bureaucracy, Henry Kissinger at the 
forefront – would accept Brazil’s status as a great power and establish a partnership 
with the country (see also Gaspari 2003; Dávila and Lesser 2012).
In either interpretation, the potential for attrition was significant. The main 
difference is that in the more traditional perception, clashes were seen as almost 
inevitable and not altogether undesirable. In the more recent one, they were 
foreseeable, but the very idea of a partnership was to coordinate strategies to avoid 
or mitigate them as much as possible (Lessa 1998; Spektor 2009; Hurrell 2013).
Brazil, the US and the Middle East
Throughout the period from 1945 to 1975, the US was obviously a central 
feature in Brazilian foreign policy, regardless of the significant changes in its 
orientation. In general, trends in Brazil’s international strategies are assessed in 
relation to the degree of autonomy towards Washington. From the end of World 
War II to the inauguration of Geisel, Brazilian foreign policy is normally evaluated 
as having been more autonomous between 1961 and 1964 and very much aligned 
between 1946 and 1950 and 1964 and 1967, with the other periods falling 
somehow in the middle of this spectrum (Cervo and Bueno 2012).
That analysis of foreign policy, however, takes mostly into account some key 
aspects of Brazil’s international relationship, but not necessarily reflect the role of 
the Middle East, which was a peripheral arena during that period (Sochaczewski 
2004; Silva and Pilla 2012). In the early years of the Cold War, Brazil had very 
rarified relations with the Middle East and most issues tended to surface at the UN. 
In that forum, either resulting from alignment or from a Westernized world-view, 
Brazilian discourse and vote was characterized by the adhesion, or low resistance, 
to the hegemony of the US, especially in issues related to international peace and 
security, at least in relation to “capital issues which involve the adoption of defense 
measures by the Western coalition against Soviet expansionism” (MRE 1957).
In 1947, Brazilian politician Oswaldo Aranha, as president of the UNGA, 
had a pivotal role in maneuvering to adopt resolution 181 (II) allowing for the 



























partition of Palestine, an outcome welcome by the US and the Soviet Union. 
Brazil’s positions in relation to the conflicts in the Middle East were qualified by 
the Ministry of External Relations as oriented by the search for equity and respect 
to the principles of international law (Breda dos Santos 2000, Breda dos Santos 
2005; Pimentel 2002). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Brazilian military took part 
in the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) from 1957 to 1967. 
As much as Aranha’s role in the General Assembly to approve the partition, 
the Brazilian contribution to UNEF I was not meant primarily to seek alignment 
with the US, but both were welcome by Washington. The relevant role of Brazil 
in drafting resolution 242 (1967) after the Six Days War was also perceived as 
a demonstration of constructive intent (Breda dos Santos 2002). All along, it 
can be said that the meaning of the Middle East for Brazil – apart from a few 
technical cooperation agreements and lackluster embassies – was very minor, not 
qualifying the region even as a potential source of attrition with the US (Casarões 
and Vigevani 2014).
In the early 1970s, a series of changes in the international scenario, in 
Brazilian domestic and foreign policies, in its relationship with the US and in the 
place occupied by the Middle East in that relation altered completely the situation. 
Brazil had been growing on a breathtaking pace since the late 1960s, with a model 
of development dependent on imported oil. As a result, the country was badly 
beaten by the oil crisis that gained momentum after the 1973 October War. Near 
the end of the government of Emílio Medici, a change was announced in Brazilian 
foreign policy for the Middle East. The adjective “equidistant” would no longer 
be used to characterize the Brazilian positions with respect to the Middle East. As 
noted by Pinheiro, “[i]n so doing the government intended to avoid any threat of 
boycott from its regular Arab suppliers, as had been made against the US and the 
Netherlands in October [1973], and later in November against Portugal, Rhodesia 
and South Africa, as part of the Afro-Arab deal” (2013, 117).
For Brazil, the oil shock was aggravated by the fact that by 1973 the Third 
World had coalesced around an Afro-Asian-Arab alliance with a clearer agenda 
and more concrete demands. In addition, the embargo promoted by Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) gave the bloc an ability to harm 
those states that were seen as supportive of Israel, the apartheid or of Portuguese 
colonialism (Yergin 1991; Braveboy-Wagner 2009). Brazil was a possible target. 
On November 24, 1973, a resolution passed by African countries included Brazil 
among six countries that could potentially be embargoed if they did not cease to 
support the government of South Africa’s white minority. Arab demonstrations 
in the same vein took place in the following months (Selcher 1978).
The oil crisis and the pro-active Third World caused strong embarrassments 
to the newly inaugurated Geisel administration. Brazil imported about 80% of 
the total oil it consumed: in 1974, it was the largest importer of goods among 
developing countries, and the seventh worldwide. The 15% of Brazilian exports 
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revenues in 1972 which were destined for the purchase of oil jumped to about 
40% two years later (MRE 1975, 96).
The Middle East, once barren, was by the mid-1970s a particularly fertile 
ground for attrition between Brazil and the US. First, the circumstances of Brazilian 
economic growth made the region increasingly important in the diplomatic agenda, 
not allowing anymore for a lighthearted treatment of the 1940s through 1960s 
where US position could be taken as a yardstick (Den Hartog 1989; Caraciki 2013). 
The Middle East became a primary political battleground between an emboldened 
Third World wielding the oil weapon and the Western countries. Even after some 
shy reprisals during the embargo, the US was seen a major supporter of Israel and 
hence disagreeing with Washington became a tool to ingratiate oneself with the 
Arab countries (Yergin 1991; Manor 1996). For Brazil’s responsible pragmatism, 
it was necessary to reassess its votes in the General Assembly based on the overall 
situation and on the specific weight of each decision in the UN.
The Middle East and Brazil in the politics of General Assembly voting
Two intertwined threads should be addressed in order to better interpret 
the meanings of Brazil’s vote in the UNGA. The first, a historical assessment of 
the stance taken by Latin American countries in general and Brazil in particular 
towards Israel and the Middle East in the UN. The second, a contextualization 
of the role of resolution 3379 (XXX) within the range of votes taken annually on 
the Middle East and in relation to the positions and alliances of the Third World 
in the UNGA.
It is the sad fate of resolutions on the Middle East that they be seen by 
most observers as pro-Israel or pro-Arab, depriving the voter of a principled 
opinion. Glick (1958, 3-17) asserted that the Latin American countries followed 
guidelines taking into account factors not directly related to the conflict, such as 
humanitarianism, right of self-determination, sovereign equality, Catholicism, 
and an interest in the universality of UN membership. Discrepancies amongst 
Latin American countries would derive mainly from divergent interpretation of 
the facts on the ground. Recent research confirms that Brazil was hardly voting 
pro or against Israel or the Arab countries, but rather having in mind its own ideas 
and priorities (Casarões and Vigevani 2014).
In the momentous 1947 vote on the partition of Mandate Palestine, Latin 
Americans were pivotal in ensuring the adoption of resolution 181 (II), having 
cast no less than 12 out of 33 affirmative votes – a fact seen at the time as a strong 
display of support for Israel, although not necessarily meant as such (Glick 1958; 
Rubin 1976; Sharif 1977). Brazil voted in favor of the partition, but the country’s 
position was less remarkable than that of Oswaldo Aranha, in charge of chairing 
the Assembly, who effectively maneuvered to achieve a positive result (Breda 
dos Santos 2000, 24-29; Vigevani and Kleinas 2000; Pimentel 2002, 288-289). 



























In the immediate aftermath of the partition and the war of 1948-1949, Brazil had 
a pattern of vote that clearly was not framed by the manacheistic view of being 
either pro-Israel or pro-Arab. Brazil tended to be against efforts to delegitimize the 
newly born state while pressuring it to solve the Jerusalem imbroglio. This voting 
pattern was retrospectively branded by Brazilian diplomacy as an equidistant one 
(Glick 1958; Breda dos Santos 2000; Pimentel 2002).
Over the following years, Latin Americans were decreasingly enthusiastic 
about Israel. The country was still perceived as a small struggling Western-style 
democracy surrounded by bigger and potentially stronger Arab nations, but 
there was a slightly pro-Israel bias in the perception that a withdrawal would be 
difficult while Arab countries continued their belligerency (Rubin 1976; Sharif 
1977; Abugattas 1982).
As an elected member of the Security Council in June 1967, Brazil was 
instrumental in helping the construction of resolution 242 (1967), with its 
dual requirement of withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the end of 
belligerency and mutual recognition. Understood by is formulators as equidistant, 
the Brazilian stance could be construed as inadvertently positive to Israel, as it 
recognized somehow a status quo, insisted on a negotiated solution and avoided 
the revolutionary proposals advanced by the more extreme members of the Arab 
League (Breda dos Santos 2000; Breda dos Santos 2002; Spektor 2010; Cervo 
and Bueno 2012).
By the early 1970s, the situation for Brazil and the other Latin Americans in 
the UNGA regarding the Middle East had changed significantly, for three main 
reasons. First, the October War and the oil shock of 1973 have shown the relevance 
of the Arab political lobby. Second and directly related, those years marked the 
actual beginnings of an authentic Third World coordination in global affairs. Latin 
American states aiming for influence would have to conform to the new reality. 
Third, 1974 was the year when the self-determination of the Palestinian people 
as such was introduced in the UN agenda. Brazil and others had started already 
to redirect their votes in order to be closer to the Arab position and criticize Israel 
more directly in hope of gaining or keeping Third World support in the votes of 
more interesting matters (Rubin 1976; Abugattas 1982; Braveboy-Wagner 2009; 
Dávila and Lesser 2012).
In any given UNGA session, there are a number of resolutions dealing 
with different aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, since 1974, with the self-
determination of the Palestinian people – and the thirtieth session, in 1975, was 
not an exception. Starting in 1972 and culminating in 1982, there was a steep 
increase in the number of resolutions, normally condemning Israel in different 
regards (Manor 1996). Albeit votes and speech rhetoric did not necessarily mean 
concrete acts outside the UNGA hall, any state could have their ability to influence 
others, to gain supporters for its own cause and even to attract investments based 
on how it voted.
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The draft which became resolution 3379 (XXX) originated from amendments 
proposed by Somalia to another draft was subsequently discussed as an autonomous 
draft under the item on elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and 
was co-sponsored mostly by the twenty members of the League of Arab States. 
In the political context of the UNGA, the draft was clearly perceived as opposed 
mostly by the US and its Western allies, as well as Israel. The text basically likened 
Zionism to racism, specifically mentioning its relationship to apartheid (Manor 
1996; Dávila and Lesser 2012; Caraciki 2013).
Resolution 3379 (XXX) was adopted by 72 affirmative votes against 35 
negative and 32 abstentions. Most resolutions on the Middle East conflict could 
command a far larger majority in the UNGA, normally over 100 of the 144 
member states (Manor 1996; Caraciki 2013). The reason for the tighter majority 
and the significant number of abstentions is the highly controversial character of 
the text, which necessarily generated tensions and pressure. In a case as such, many 
countries would simply choose not to explicitly take sides, in order to avoid being 
further pressured or blamed. Proponents of the resolution would certainly take into 
account the controversy involved and the vulnerability of others. A member state 
could be considered friendly to a cause even if not voting for all the resolutions. 
In assessing how to vote, Brazil would certainly take into account how it would 
be seen by those for and against the resolution.
Israel and the US denounced acerbically the resolution and both countries 
tried their best to avoid its adoption – Israeli Ambassador Herzog having even torn 
the draft from the rostrum. The immediate concrete consequences of resolution 
3379 (XXX) were confined to a symbolic corner. The text did not foreshadow the 
expulsion of Israel from the UN, it was rather an alternative to that strategy. The 
resolution, however, could evolve to other measures, similar to those adopted to 
deal with South Africa. Over the following years, Israel was increasingly isolated 
in the UN and in other international fora, having difficulty to have its candidates 
elected and being included in programs of work as the object of the combat against 
racism (Manor 1996).
Voting in favor of the resolution was seen as a result as a gesture of opposition 
to Israel, in spite of any explanation claiming otherwise. It was further, mainly 
in the case of a Latin American country such as Brazil, perceived in Washington 
as an act of defiance, with anti-humanistic and anti-Semitic overtones. For the 
Arab nations, a favorable vote would signify an outstanding gesture of criticism 
to Israel, which might be worth rewarding. One can speculate that a hypothetical 
Brazilian abstention would not have been the ideal choice of the US, but would 
certainly have deflected most of the criticism. For the Arab group, an abstention 
might have been seen – in light of the already changed Brazilian pattern of vote 
in the standard resolutions on the Middle East conflict – as a lesser problem, but 
hardly a reason to punish Brazil (Dávila and Lesser, 2012; Caraciki 2013).



























Resolution 3379 (XXX) recalibrating the Brazil-US partnership
As noted, in his 1974 speech at the UN General Assembly, Silveira had 
aligned the vectors that would guide the Brazilian foreign policy. With responsible 
pragmatism, the Brazilian diplomacy sought to depart from the ideological 
alignments that compromised the pursuit of key Brazilian interests. He mentioned 
the reassessment of Brazilian stances on apartheid, Portuguese colonialism, Israel’s 
occupation of Arab territories, and the Palestinian people, framing the change in 
Brazil’s pattern of vote that had started to take place. The issue of Zionism was 
not even considered (Seixas Corrêa 2007, 309-317; Sharif 1977).
The guidelines forwarded to the Brazilian delegation in New York for the 
1975 General Assembly suggests that:
The confrontation between the United States and the non-aligned will probably 
reach its most acute point in the debate on the Middle East issue. In the absence 
of real progress in bilateral understandings, Arab countries will tend to use the 
parliamentary possibilities to pressure Israel, increasing its diplomatic isolation 
(Secretaria de Estado das Relações Exteriores [SERE] 1975g).
The instructions, however, assumed that the Arab countries would try to 
expel Israel from the UN, suspend it, deny the country its credentials or somehow 
request an exam of its participation in the Organization. As late as September 18, 
it did not foresee the idea of equating Zionism and racism. In any case, it indicates 
that, having rejected more extreme propositions in the previous year, Brazil would 
align with no position without careful consideration of the parliamentary scenario 
(SERE, Ofício 77, 9/18/1975).
A few days later, on 3 October, the Somalis brought up Zionism in their 
amendments to the omnibus resolution on racism. The insertion took all countries 
by surprise, even Israel. When a concerned Brazilian delegation requested 
instructions from Brasília on 13 October, the draft on Zionism had already been 
made autonomous from the original all-encompassing draft (Missão do Brasil 
junto às Nações Unidas [Delbrasonu] 1975a). Sometime between 13 and 15 
October, the request was reinforced by a phone call from Ambassador Sergio 
Corrêa da Costa to the Minister. According to Silveira, the Ambassador wrongly 
reported that most, if not all Latin Americans, would vote favorably, and that 
the paragraph on Zionism was within a larger resolution – although the original 
cable from New York transmitted an almost final text, and indicated a few Latin 
American countries willing to vote for it something that proved wrong (Abreu 
1979; Manor 1996; Spektor 2010).
Although the day before the Mission had cabled the final draft on Zionism 
(A/C.3/L.2159), the terse answer from Brasília on 16 October simply stated that 
Brazil should vote in favor of the draft and make no explanation of the vote, 
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alluding to “instructions conveyed by phone”. Given a sibylline reference in 
another cable a few days later, it is believable that Corrêa da Costa had argued for 
abstention or absence in view of the suddenness of the draft and its controversial 
nature. Silveira claimed, years later, he wanted to make an explanation of vote or 
reverse the vote in the Plenary, but none of these are initially hinted (Góes 1978; 
Sochaczewski 2004; Spektor 2010; Delbrasonu 1975a; Delbrasonu 1975b; SERE 
1975b; SERE 1975e).
Unlike the discussions about the vote in the Plenary a few weeks later, records 
about this initial decision are difficult to find. The difficulty is aggravated because 
most recollections and memoirs tend to conflate the two moments of vote, not 
distinguishing between the initial one in the Third Committee and the latter one 
in the Plenary. It is, however, worth speculating on the reasons for the original 
instruction.
Apparently, Silveira and Vice-Minister Ambassador Saraiva Guerreiro were 
initially in favor of abstaining or not taking part in the vote, a technique used in 
the previous session when resolution 3236 (XXIX) was considered too ambiguous, 
and put to vote too fast. Both were cognizant of diplomatic subtleties and knew an 
abstention would not mean cooperation with the US, but rather a diminished level 
of disagreement with both Washington and the Arab countries. President Geisel, 
however, was distrustful of the option of abstaining, perceived as a diplomatic 
subterfuge to yield to US preferences and might have preferred to vote in favor. In 
addition to that, if, over the phone, Corrêa da Costa had reported a Latin American 
majority in favor, Brazil would feel less embarrassed about voting affirmatively 
(SERE, Ofício 77, 9/18/1975; D’Araújo and Castro, 1997; Sochaczewski 2004; 
Spektor 2010; Guerreiro 2010).
Traditionally, authors have related the positive vote with an attempt to being 
closer to Arab countries. It is difficult to assess if oil was a direct factor, since 
the embargo had stopped in early 1974 and was reserved for close allies of Israel 
or Portugal – one reason for Brazil to have changed its vote over a year before. 
Brazil might have sought to ingratiate itself with potential Arab investors or just 
underestimated the domestic and international negative reactions in assessing them 
against the possible boost to be gained amongst its Third World partners (Den 
Hartog 1989; Gonçalves and Myiamoto 1993; Spektor 2010; Pinheiro 2013).
The international uproar about the vote was dutifully reported by the 
Brazilian mission to the UN and probably surprised the Brazilian government, as 
much as the lack of Latin American consensus. Strong accusations were formulated 
by the US and European delegations, which reverberated strongly in the world 
press. In Brazil itself the initial reaction of the press was limited, but increased 
after the harsh position taken by the daily Estado de S. Paulo on October 21. The 
Jewish community, always on guard against possible waves of anti-Semitism, was 
quick to mobilize and denounce the choice of vote.



























Immediately after the vote in the Third Committee, President Geisel 
apparently started considering changing the vote from affirmative to abstention 
when the subject would go to the Plenary in early November. According to Góes 
(1978, 30), the General was surprised by the response to the Brazilian position 
and believed that the decision was taken precipitously, after that single phone 
call from New York to Silveira, and was willing to reverse the vote. In later years, 
Geisel would reconstruct his memory to a peremptory assertion of his conviction 
on the correctness of the resolution. There is reason, however, to believe that, in 
the early days after the initial vote, the President was prone to change his mind 
– a version supported by Silveira himself (Góes 1978; Abreu 1979; Mariz 1993; 
D’Araújo and Castro 1997; Breda dos Santos 2003; Spektor 2010).
More than the factual evidence of a willingness to change the vote, it is 
arguable that the kind of reaction evoked by the Brazilian yea pointed to its 
dissonance with responsible pragmatism. The policy steered by Geisel and Silveira 
was concerned with reaping the benefits of international interdependence by 
manipulating the international system in order to maximize Brazil’s power. It was 
not meant to recant Western values, but rather to explore the limits of Brazilian 
autonomy within them. (Lessa 1998; Spektor 2004). Yet, the initial reaction to 
the vote was utterly negative within and outside Brazil, with the very core values 
of the country being questioned without any immediate gain.
One week after the vote in the Third Committee, the US campaign against 
the draft resolution reached Brasília in the form of a lukewarm demarche of a 
mid-level diplomat from the Embassy with the acting Director of International 
Organizations. The official presented a standardized note on the disappointment 
with the vote. After the demarche, Washington received a report of Brazil’s surprise 
with the strong reaction to the vote, and acknowledgement that Silveira’s 22 
October interview while visiting London2 was an attempt to mitigate the vote’s 
deleterious effects. The report also registered the unlikelihood that Brazil would 
change its attitude in the Plenary and the perception that statements by the Israeli 
Chargé d’Affairs were an unwelcome pressure. That same day, acting Minister 
Guerreiro authorized two cables to the Brazilian Mission to the UN, reporting on 
the US note and on the outrage in Brazil for the supposed leakage of said document 
to the press, supposedly by the the Department of State. The US demarche and 
its content were reported on October 24 by the Brazilian press and the Brazilian 
irritation, the following day (American Embassy, 1975, 1976a, 1976b; SERE, 
1975c; SERE, 1975d; “Washington censura o voto”, 1975). The vehemence of 
the cables sent from Brazil hint, although there are no records, of more forceful 
demarches by the US and maybe other actors.
2  Since Brazil did not explain its vote at the Third Committee, the interview by Silveira in London was the 
first explanation and expresses Brazil’s realization that its decision was more complex than expected. The Minister 
affirmed only that “we did not vote against Zionism, but rather against racial discrimination”.
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This is a turning point. Until the publicizing of the demarche, albeit 
reluctantly, there was a chance of changing the vote. Once the public became 
aware of the US pressure, Brazil feared to be put in the same position as Chile, 
which, in the same press report, was criticized for voting affirmatively, denounced 
for human rights violations and accused of selling its vote to the Arab countries to 
avoid condemnation by the same General Assembly. The final Chilean decision 
to change vote was seen as a sign of vulnerability, succumbing to a dictate of 
Washington (Hofman 1975; Sochaczewski 2004).
The perception that Brazil was having its arm twisted by Washington to 
change its vote was apparently decisive in galvanizing Geisel’s decision not to 
change his position. Different sources report that the President was disgruntled 
by the publicity given to the demarche, and felt that national honor demanded 
that Brazil should not yield to pressure. Likewise, Minister Silveira, in a statement 
given in Paris on 25 October, staunchly defended the Brazilian vote (“Itamaraty 
reage à nota official”, 1975). Silveira, in an interview years later, confirmed that 
the controversy about the US note was central in Brazil’s decision to maintain its 
position (Góes 1978; Mariz 1993; Abreu 1979; Spektor 2010).
Following the Plenary session affirmative vote, in early November, the 
government developed its arguments in favor of Brazil’s position along the lines of 
adequacy, if not necessity, with responsible pragmatism, denial of any anti-Israeli or 
anti-Semitic sentiment and reassertion of the principle of fighting discrimination, 
including Zionism, seen as a “racial and exclusivistic doctrine” (UNGA 1975, 
798). Implications that the ultimate reason to avoid change was the relationship 
with the US were carefully eschewed. Yet the pressure on Geisel was evident in 
the fact that Brazil ultimately made an explanation of vote in the Plenary, in spite 
of its original intention not to justify itself (SERE, 1975f).
The process of deciding how Brazil would vote has to be understood not as 
a simple indignant reaction to a purported offense to national pride, but rather 
in the broader framework of the relations between the two countries. As outlined 
above, there was an attempt, on one side, by Geisel-Silveira and, on the other, by 
Ford-Kissinger to establish a partnership on equal terms. Part of the bargain was 
that the US would not belittle Brazil and would respect those disagreements that 
were to emerge, in particular in areas where, as was the case of the Middle East, 
Washington had been warned about Brazil’s need to tread its own way (Gaspari 
2003; Spektor 2009; Spektor, 2010).
The initial vote, however unclear its immediate motivation, might have been 
a move in search for Third World solidarity or Arab investments, and the ensuing 
hesitation, a result of the considerable domestic and international backlash; but 
the final and more important decision was part of the ongoing dialogue with 
Washington, not so much in its substance but rather in asserting the terms of the 
conversation and the status of the partners.



























The view that this vote was “a condition for Brazil’s own economic 
expansionism” (Moniz Bandeira 1989, 226) certainly does not fit into the factual 
situation of hesitation and half-hearted reprehension, culminating in a decision 
that was far from seen as ideal by Brazil. It is not possible either to claim that the 
vote derived from “an imperialist self-image of Brazil as leader of the non-aligned 
world in the 1970s” (Dávila and Lesser 2012, 228), or that the support for the 
resolution as an “anti-Zionist bet” to reap benefits from newly-found developing 
allies (Caraciki 2013). It is true that ex post facto Brazil developed critical arguments 
about Zionism, but they were always weak in the country’s discourse. Even if the 
Brazilian decision generated good-will or concrete gains from the Third World, it 
was not originally aimed at that. In the months after the vote, Brazilian diplomacy 
did not openly change its position but tried to assimilate it to historical principles 
followed by the country or dodge the issue as subtly as possible (MRE, 1975; 
American Embassy, 1976a; Sochaczewski, 2004; Spektor, 2010).
Conclusion
Some factual details of the decision-making process might never be fully 
uncovered. Yet, what is known is enough to deepen the understanding on Brazilian 
foreign policy decision-making process during the Geisel administration, on 
responsible pragmatism, and on the position of Brazil regarding the US and the 
Middle East.
The vote on resolution 3379 (XXX) was taken mostly by the President himself 
with an unclear degree of influence by Silveira. The main factor in the first vote 
was most likely simply time – or lack thereof – added to the centralizing style of 
the President. In the Plenary, the underlying reason to vote affirmatively could 
not easily be clarified given its nature of response to the US.
The case of resolution 3379 (XXX) is useful to demystify some ideas about 
responsible pragmatism. It is a common feature of many analyses to hypostasize a 
complete doctrine and practice of foreign policy for Silveira’s tenure. As much as 
he might have strategized his steps, the evidence is clear that the policy was built 
along the way, with the practical realization of rhetorical postulates as adaptations 
with varied degrees of coherence with the original ideas. In a similar manner, as the 
denunciation of the military agreement after a report on human rights, the episode 
of resolution 3379 (XXX) only post facto could be made to fit the principles Brazil 
wanted to uphold. Brazil incorporated the vote into its panoply of consolidated 
diplomatic positions, unequivocally calling “Zionism a form of racism and racial 
discrimination”, although from time to time a testimony to the harshness of the 
decision would resurface.
The very issue of the Middle East was an example of the multiplicity of 
paths that could be taken by the Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil had changed its 
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pattern of vote in the UNGA already in 1974, with a clear goal of avoiding the 
embargo, and with the more remote interest of receiving special treatment from 
Arab investors. Yet, supporting resolution 3379 (XXX) was not a sine qua non step 
in this path. Brazil had to swiftly assess the possibilities of how to vote and what 
would be the consequences – and evidence points to the decision makers being 
initially unclear on the issue.
What transpires in the documentation is that the Middle East and its conflicts 
increasingly became an issue to be seriously considered in the relations between 
Brazil and the US. If in previous years Brazil could see the region with relative 
indifference, it became indispensable to take clearer positions after 1973. Even 
more important, it was known to Brazilian and US policy makers that friction 
could be caused by the Middle East. Geisel and Silveira expected it to be treated 
in the framework of the dialogue proposed by Kissinger. The vote on resolution 
3379 (XXX) was far from an accident, but also from a Machiavellian master plan. 
It was a message sent to Washington on how Brazil saw the bilateral relations of 
the two countries should play out in the future.
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Abstract
In 1975, Brazil voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3379 (XXX), 
equating Zionism with a form of racism. Focusing on the decision-making process of president 
Ernesto Geisel’s (1974-1979) foreign policy, “responsible pragmatism”, this article discusses 
how the ultimate decision to vote in favor of resolution was taken taking into account mainly 
US-Brazil relationship.
Keywords: Brazilian Foreign Policy, United Nations Organization, Resolution 3379 (XXX) of the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Zionism, Racism, “Responsible Pragmatism” foreign 
policy, Ernesto Geisel’s Government Foreign Policy (1974-1979).
Resumo
Em 1975, o Brasil votou a favor da resolução da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas 3379 (XXX), 
que equiparou o sionismo a uma forma de racismo. Centrando-se no processo decisório da 
Política Externa do “Pragmatismo Responsável” desenvolvida pelo governo do Presidente Ernesto 
Geisel (1974-1979), este artigo discute como a decisão final para votar a favor da resolução foi 
tomada tendo em conta principalmente as relações entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos.
Palavras-chave: Política Externa Brasileira, Organização das Nações Unidas, Resolução 3379 (XXX) 
da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, Sionismo, Racismo, Política Externa do “Pragmatismo 
Responsável”, Política Externa do Governo Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979).
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